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Abstract
It has been proved that in an homogeneous product industry, price over
marginal costs, business stealing, set up costs and free entry imply excess
entry from the welfare point of view. The proof assumes identical firms. We
show by example that with non-identical firms, those conditions are com-
patible with insufficient entry. Besides, we provide a criterium to evaluate
excess entry in industries with non-identical firms and externalities.
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1. Introduction
Is free entry convenient for society? It is well-known that for competitive
markets the answer is positive. It has also long been known that for imper-
fectly competitive markets entry may be socially wasteful. The reason is that
although the entry of an additional firm expands the market, the cost of this
market expansion may be higher than its value, because the new firm gets
some of its market share by stealing from existing businesses. This result
has been proved with different degrees of generality for homogeneous mar-
kets by von Weizsaker (1980), Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura
and Kiyono (1987). All these papers base their conclusions on models with
identical firms.
The approach of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) is quite general. They
state that in any homogeneous market with free entry, price over marginal
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cost, set up costs, business stealing and identical firms, entry is excessive.
This result is valid whatever the way the firms compete among themselves,
cooperative or not. Considering that the number of firms must be an integer,
this result is subject to some usually minor qualifications. With product
diversity they find that the welfare of free entry is ambiguous.
In real markets, firms in the same industry tend to be different. Will
the fact that there are different firms in the market affect the result of ex-
cess entry? Suppose an observer from a competition authority examines an
industry –that seems to be in equilibrium; this industry shows price over
marginal costs, significant fixed cost, business stealing and free entry; could
this observer be sure that there is excess entry if the firms happen to be
different? The main purpose of this note is to provide some illustration to
this question.
This paper relies on two main ideas. The first one is that business stealing
could be beneficial if the “robber” has lower costs than the “victim.” The
second one is that with non-identical firms, the equilibrium market structure
will probably allow for firms that break even, together with firms with pos-
itive profits. In this structure there will be presumably less firms. Entry, if
successful, will tend to replace high cost firms rather than lower cost firms;
and that could be beneficial, even if business stealing is present.
Business stealing has established itself as a widely accepted and used
concept in the literature. But it is usually considered as harmful to society.
However, business stealing is a essential part of competition, perfect or im-
perfect. If the degree of competition is measured only with the number of
identical firms in a market, it is easy to agree to that negative view. But
when competition is seen more as a kind of biological process where the best
are the successful ones, then more firms in the market probably means more
incentives for the incumbents to improve, striving to being different from the
other firms, and entry is also a good antidote against X-inefficiency. From
this point of view, business stealing might be considered beneficial. However,
in this paper we will rely on the static view of welfare.
With different firms there is more freedom for models than with identical
firms. There is probably no single model that captures all the features of dif-
ferent firms. We present in this paper four models that show that insufficient
entry is compatible with business stealing, free entry, price over marginal
costs and fixed costs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 will show how, when firms does
not share the same marginal costs, business stealing does not necessarily in-
dicate excess entry. Section 3 will provide similar results for the case of firms
with identical marginal costs, but with an unequal market share. Section 4
will propose a simple alternative that is better suited than business steal-
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ing to determine the welfare effects of entry, when firms are different and
there are externalities: the evolution of average costs with entry. Section 5
concludes.
2. Different marginal costs
In this section we present two models, a Cournot and a Stackelberg one.
There are two types of firms with constant marginal cost, and the demand
is of the constant elasticity type. In an identical model, without fixed costs
and unspecified demand, Ghosh and Saha (2007) show that there is always
excess entry, while we find insufficient entry for some cases. The reason for
the inconsistency between their paper and ours is that they assume that the
demand function, p(Q), always fulfills p′(Q) +Qp′′(Q) ≤ 0. In this way they
exclude from their analysis the constant elasticity type of demand.
We begin our analysis considering the welfare as a function of the number
of firms.
Let us consider a market with demand p = p(Q) and two types of firms.
There are r type 1 firms with marginal cost c1, and free entry of type 2 firms
with marginal cost c2 > c1. Type 2 firms have a fixed cost of F , and type 1
firms have a fixed cost of G.
Welfare in this market with n high cost entrants is
W =
∫ Q
0
p(s)ds− rc1q1 − nc2q2 − nF − rG (1)
Deriving, we get
∂W
∂n
= p(r
∂q1
∂n
+ n
∂q2
∂n
+ q2)− rc1∂q1
∂n
− c2q2 − nc2∂q2
∂n
− F. (2)
With free entry, ne firms will enter so that the profits of all high cost
firms be zero. Evaluating equation 2 with free entry, and rearranging we get
∂W
∂n
∣∣∣
n=ne
= r(p− c1)∂q1
∂n
+ n(p− c2)∂q2
∂n
(3)
Even if we suppose that there is business stealing, i.e., ∂Q
∂n
< q2, still
∂q1
∂n
could be positive. In this case, there could be insufficient entry with business
stealing.
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2.1. A Cournot Model
Let us consider a Cournot oligopoly with demand p = (a/Q)1/ and two
types of firms. There are r firms of type 1 with marginal cost c1 = 1,
2 and
free entry of firms of type 2 with marginal cost c2 = c > 1. As before, type 2
firms have a fixed cost of F , and type 1 firms have a fixed cost of G.
Profit in any Cournot oligopoly is Π = p(Q)q − c(q); where Q is the
quantity produced in the industry, and q is the quantity produced by the
firm. Deriving Π, we get ∂Π
∂q
= p′(Q)q + p − c′(q) = 0. Rearranging this
expression we get the well-known condition, where si is the market share,
si = qi/Q:
p− ci
p
=
si

. (4)
The second derivative of profit, Π(x) = x
(
a
Q+x
)1/
− cx, for a firm pro-
ducing x at a marginal cost c, while the others produce Q, is:
∂2Π
∂x2
= −
(2Q+ x− x)
(
a
Q+x
) 1

2 (Q+ x)2
.
If  ≥ 1, the second derivative of profit is always negative. If  < 1, then this
expression is negative whenever x < 2Q/(1 − ). We restrict ourselves to
these situations.
Remember that there are r firms with marginal cost 1, and n firms with
marginal cost n > 1. Let us call s2 = s to the market share of the high cost
firms. Then, the market share of type 1 firms is s1 = (1 − ns)/r. Applying
equation 4, yields,
p− 1
p
=
1− ns
r
, and
p− c
p
=
s

. (5)
From here the equilibrium price and quantity in the market is
p =
r + nc
r + n− 1/, and Q = a
(
r + n− 1/
r + nc
)
, (6)
and the market shares are
2This assumption represent no loss of generality, because if the marginal cost were, for
instance, t = 3.5$, we will redefine our monetary unit to a unit whose value is exactly
3.5$.
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s1 =
1 + n(c− 1)
r + nc
, and s2 = s =
c− r(c− 1)
r + nc
(7)
We can calculate equation 3:
∂W
∂n
∣∣∣
n=ne
=
Qs(An2 +Bn+ C)
(r + nc)(r+ n− 1)2
with
A = 
(
(c− 1)2(2 + )r − c2) .
B = (c− 1)2(2 + )r(r− 2) + c(c− 2r) + c2.
C = r((1− r) + 1).
(8)
Equation 8 provides the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 1. In a Cournot market with constant elasticity of demand, ,
r incumbents with constant marginal cost 1, and free entry of firms with fixed
entry costs and constant marginal costs c > 1, the entry will be insufficient
whenever c
2
(c−1)2(2+) < r <
c
(c−1) .
Proof. We will prove that c
2
(c−1)2(2+) < r <
c
(c−1) implies A,B,C, s > 0.
(1) Note that c
2
(c−1)2(2+) <
c
(c−1) is equivalent to c > 1 +
1

. Consequently,
r < c
(c−1) implies (because c/(c − 1) is a decreasing function for c > 1)
r < 1 + 1

, and then C > 0.
(2) The expression c
2
(c−1)2(2+) < r is equivalent to A > 0.
(3) The expression r < c
(c−1) is equivalent to s > 0.
(4) In B, we substitute r by its lower bound c
2
(c−1)2(2+) in all ocurrences
but in (c− 2r), where we substitute by its upper bound c
(c−1) . It yields
B > c
2(c−−1)2
(+1)(c−1)2 > 0.
With A,B,C, s > 0, it is clear that entry is insufficient. Naturally, there
could be other values with insufficient entry.
We show in the adjunct figure the areas of excess and insufficient entry.
Note that when c = r = 1 + 1/, then A = s = B = 0.
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Numerical examples. We begin with the specific case r =  = 1. From
equations 6 and 7 we find
p = c+
1
n
, Q =
na
1 + nc
, q1 =
na(1 + n(c− 1))
(1 + nc)2
, q2 =
na
(1 + nc)2
. (9)
The equilibrium number of firms, ne, can be found easily:
Π = (p− c)q2 − F = a
(1 + nec)2
− F = 0⇒ ne = 1
c
(√
a
F
− 1
)
Let a = 625, c = 12 and F = 1. Then ne = 2. What is the optimal
number of firms, n∗? We will evaluate W = a lnQ− (q1 + ncq2 + nF ); or,
625 ln
(
625n
1 + 12n
)
−
(
625n(1 + 11n)
(1 + 12n)2
+
12 · 625n2
(1 + 12n)2
+ n
)
.
The maximum is found at n∗ = 6.28. In this case only two firms enter,
while the optimal number of firms is at least 6. With a more elastic demand,
we can find insufficient entry with c not that far from 1. For example, with
 = 5 and r = 1. Then we will find insufficient entry for c = 1.224.
2.2. A Stackelberg Model
In a Stackelberg market with demand p = a/Q, the leader has constant
marginal cost t = 1. The followers have constant marginal cost c > 1 and a
fixed cost F . The leader set a quantity, K, knowing that there will be free
entry of followers.
Demand for followers is p = a/(Q + K). Any entrant has profit Π =
(p − c)q − F . To maximize, any follower solves p − c − qa/(Q + K)2 = 0.
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Suppose that the number of entrants is n. Adding up all this equations for
the n followers, we get n(p − c) − Qa/(Q + K)2 = 0. Using the demand
equation, and rearranging yields the demand of the leader when there are n
followers:
K =
anc− a(n− 1)p
p2
.
The leader’s profit, ΠL = (p− 1)K, is maximized with a price and quan-
tity:
p =
2nc
n+ nc− 1 , and K = a
c2n2 − (n− 1)2
4nc
.
It is easy to see that the price p is decreasing with n while the quantity
of the leader K is increasing with n. The quantity produced by the followers
is
Q =
a
p
−K = a (n
2 − (nc− 1)2)
4nc
.
From this expression, it is clear that when c ≥ 1 + 1/n, the leader will
not allow any firm entering the market. We suppose that c < 1 + 1/n.
In this market there is business stealing when
Q
n
− ∂(Q+K)
∂n
= a
(1− c2)n2 + 2cn− 3
4cn2
> 0.
This happens when
c−√3− 2c2
c2 − 1 < n <
c+
√
3− 2c2
c2 − 1 .
For example, for c = 1.1, then 1.6 < n < 8.8; for c = 1.05, then 1.5 < n <
18.9. In any case we restrict ourselves to cases where business stealing is
present.
The profit of the followers is
Π = (p− c)Q
n
− F = a(n+ 1− nc)
2
4n2
− F.
Consequently, the number of firms with free entry is
ne =
1
2
√
F
a
+ c− 1
.
Applying equation 3, or deriving directly we find, calling x =
√
F/a,
7
∂W
∂n
∣∣∣
n=ne
=
a(2(1 + 2c)x3 − 2(2− c2)x2 + 2(c− 1)2x+ c(c− 1)2)
2c(1− x) (10)
With equation 10, we can state the following
Proposition 2. In a Stackelberg market with demand p = a/Q, only one
leader with constant marginal cost 1, and free entry of firms with fixed entry
costs and constant marginal costs c > 1, entry could be insufficient.
Proof. We suppose that x =
√
F/a < 1.
Looking only at the coefficients of x2 and x in the numerator of equa-
tion 10, it can be seen that −2(2 − c2)x2 + 2(c − 1)2x > 0 is equivalent to
x < (c−1)
2
2−c2 . Then, for whatever c ∈ (1, 1+
√
3
2
), we can find x < 1 so that
equation 10 is positive, and entry is insufficient. Naturally x could be higher
because we have not considered the two additional positive monomials.
Curiously, in the Stackelberg model is easier to find examples when the
cost of the entrants is similar to that of the incumbent. For example, with
demand p = 1000/Q, marginal cost c = 1.1, and fixed cost F = 5. The
number of firms will be ne = 4. The optimal number of firms is n∗ = 10, but
remember that there is business stealing until n = 8.8. Increasing F to 5.1,
the optimal number of firms is n∗ = 8.89.
When a = 700, F = 0.88 and c = 1.05, then the number of entrants is
ne = 8.27, while n∗ = 18.638.
To evaluate the optimal number of entrants we have used the derivative
of welfare, W = a ln(Q+K)− (K + cnq + nF ), with respect to n.
∂W
∂n
= a
(c2 − 1)2n3 − (c− 1)2(c+ 1)n2 − (c− 1)2n+ c+ 1
4cn2(nc+ n− 1) − F.
The examples in this section should be viewed as counterexamples, in the
sense that it cannot be assured that, when firms are not identical, free entry
is always excessive. The fact that most common models show that there is
excess entry does not imply that in reality it must be so. It depends on the
demand and on the way firms compete among themselves.
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3. The same marginal costs
Both models in the past section have firms with different marginal costs.
In this section we present two models, where both firms share the same
marginal cost. The first model of this section has in common with the two
preceding models that upon entry some firm expand its output. However, in
the second example of this section, all firms reduce its output upon entry, all
have the same marginal cost, and, nevertheless, we find insufficient entry.
3.1. Some differentiation
It is well known that, with product differentiation, the welfare of free
entry depends on the balance between business stealing and the value added
by the variety of new entrants. In this model there is product differentiation,
but entrants do not add to variety, because entrants are in an homogeneous
market. However, the price in the homogeneous market influence the price
in the differentiated markets.
Consider several interrelated markets, in one of them outcomes are deter-
mined through Cournot competition with fixed entry costs, while the other
sets prices depending on the first market’s outcome.
A number of examples can be used to illustrate this type of connection.
Consider, for example, the market for name-brand clothes and that of their
generic counterparts so that, if similarly priced, consumers will prefer the
brand product. If competition in the first market results in a certain equi-
librium price p, the producer in the second market will charge a price of
p + t, where t is the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay to ac-
quire the brand-name product. Another example would entail identical goods
produced in an oligopoly market and a monopolistic market separated by a
certain distance. If the monopolist charges a price that exceeds the oligopoly
price plus the cost of transportation, every consumer will purchase the prod-
uct from the oligopoly market, even if it means paying the transportation
cost. Consider that there is excess entry in the radio broadcasting market.
The lower price for advertisers in radio may attract advertisers from TV or
other media, and consequently the price in these other media may be lowered.
Under these circumstances, the social welfare effects of entry in the first
market (the one that sets prices independently) cannot be accurately mea-
sured by considering only the direct effects. Additional entry in the first
market will reduce not only the price prevalent in that market, but also the
price charged in the second (dependent) market. If the price reduction in the
second market is large enough, society may benefit from additional entry in
the first market, even if the direct benefits are not large.
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The model. In a market with demand Q = 1− p, there are m differentiated
firms and free entry for generic firms. Demand is divided in Q = a(1− p) for
the generic product, and Qi = si(1 − a)(1 − p) for the differentiated firms,
i = 1, . . . ,m, with
∑
si = 1. The technology to provide this good is a fixed
cost, with no variable cost. The fixed cost for the generic product is F , and
for the differentiated goods, Fi. In the generic market, firms play Cournot
with free entry, while in the differentiated markets each firm is a monopoly,
so that no one can sell there except the incumbents. However, clients of the
differentiated good can buy the generic, but with a transportation cost, t.
If p is the generic price, then the price of all the differentiated products is
going to be p+ t− (with  > 0 very small), because, with a higher price, the
differentiated firms would have no clients. We rule out competition among
differentiated producers to simplify the model.
In a market with linear demand, p = r − sQ, willingness to pay as a
function of price is (r2−p2)/(2s). In the situation above described welfare is
W =
1− a
2
(
1− (p+ t)2)+ a
2
(
1− p2)− nF − m∑
i=1
Fi.
Deriving,
∂W
∂n
= − (p+ (1− a)t) ∂p
∂n
− F.
In the generic market with n firms, price will be p = 1/(1 + n); conse-
quently, ∂p/∂n = −p2. And the profit will be zero when ap2 = F . Then,
welfare is
∂W
∂n
∣∣∣
n=ne
= p2(p+ (1− a)t− a). (11)
From equation 11, whenever t > a/(1−a), free entry is always insufficient,
whatever the number of firms. But, as p = 1/(1+n), it can be also insufficient
when ne < 1
a−(1−a)t − 1.
Total output in this model is Q = n/(1 + n)− (1− a)t, and each entrant
produces q = a/(1 + n). There is business stealing when dQ/dn < q, or
1/a < n + 1. Consequently, there is insufficient entry with business stealing
when 1/a < ne + 1 < 1
a−(1−a)t .
For example if a = 0.2 and t = 0.1, entry will be insufficient with business
stealing when 4 < ne ≤ 7.3.
3.2. Different outputs
Suppose that a group of identical firms in an industry agree on a price p.
Is it sure that all firms will sell the same quantity? No; clients are indifferent
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among firms, because all firms sell an homogeneous product with the same
price. Suppose that there is some kind of a structure on the demand; for
example there are some groups of different size, and each group prefer –if the
price of the product is the same across firms– to buy all of them from the
same firm. Some firms can get a big market share, while other firms have less
clients. If a firm gets a small market share, it could low the price, but then
the agreement on price is broken, and competition begins. It is not unlikely
that identical firms sell different quantities in a cooperative oligopoly with
an agreement on prices.
If there is an agreement on prices and all firms sell the same quantity
with free entry, then the number of firms is at a maximum. Suppose that
all firms sell q. Any firm that sell less than q will exit the market. If the
distribution is uneven, any different firm will sell more than q; consequently,
with different firms, there are less firms.
Before we proceed with the model, it is advisable to remember the purpose
of this note. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that in any oligopoly with
identical firms, cooperative or not, set up costs, price over marginal cost
and free entry imply excess entry. The question we want to address is the
following: will there be always excess entry if technologically identical firms
sell different quantities? Our answer is no, because the number of firms
depends on how output is distributed among them.
The model. Consider an oligopoly with demand p = a/Q, and free entry of
identical firms, all with fixed cost F = 1 and no variable costs. There is an
agreement among the firms on a price, depending on the number of firms,
p = a/(n+1). Clients are indifferent among firms. But, by the characteristics
of demand, the clients distribute themselves in the following way
qi =
2i
n
,
where i represents the order of entry (i = 1, . . . , n) of all the firms in the
market. The oldest firm in the market will be firm i = 1, and the newest
i = n. Total production is
Q =
n∑
i=1
2i
n
= n+ 1.
As firms continue to enter, the benefit for the oldest one decreases, until it
reaches zero. At this point, any additional entry will cause the oldest firm
to exit, and the oldest firm in the market has now index i = 1.
In this market there is business stealing, because the output of any entrant
is 2, while total output increases in 1. Besides, all firms reduce their output
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with entry. When a new firm enters and none of the older ones leaves the
market, firms keep their order, but the total number of firms in the market,
n, increases so that each qi is reduced. If a firm leaves as another enters the
market, the actual number of firms, n, would not change, but, since i will
decrease for all firms, qi is also reduced. This is true for any number of firms
in the market.
Suppose that ne is the equilibrium number of firms. We want to calculate
the optimal number of firms, n∗. If ne is an equilibrium, then the first firm
has no profits: peq1 − F = 0. This means that pe = ne/2. We know that
total output is ne + 1. Then, using the demand function, pe = a/(ne + 1),
yields a = ne(ne + 1)/2.
If the number of firms increases by 1, then the market expansion is 1.
The cost of the new entrant is also F = 1. So until p = 1 there is room to
beneficial entry. If a = ne(ne + 1)/2, then p = 1 means 1 = a/(n∗ + 1). In
consequence n∗ = a − 1, or n∗ = ne(ne + 1)/2 − 1. For example, if a = 10,
then ne = 4 and n∗ = 9; if a = 210, then ne = 20 and n∗ = 209.
Suppose that in equilibrium, with a = 210 and ne = 20, a new firm enters
producing q = 1.11, with a market expansion of 0.11 and a business stealing
of 1, while the first firm, with losses, remains in the market. The value of the
market expansion, 0.11 ·210/21.11 > 1, indicates that the entry is convenient
for society. This example describes an equilibrium with free entry, where a
new firm enters with a tiny market expansion –less than a 0.6%–, most of
the output of this firm comes from business stealing, but welfare increases
with entry.
There is a big insufficient entry in this market –a cooperative oligopoly
with zero marginal costs, identical firms and fixed costs. This is admit-
tedly an ad-hoc example, but shows that without the hypothesis of identical
output, the result by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) is no longer valid for
cooperative oligopolies agreeing on price. We need to know how output is
distributed among firms to see if there is excessive entry or not.
4. Average costs
We show in this paper that, with non identical firms, the presence of
business stealing in a market with free entry, price over marginal cost and
set up cost does not necessarily imply excess entry. We now want to provide
a criterium to judge excess entry, that is useful when firms are different or
there are externalities among firms. This criterium is the average cost in the
industry as a function of the number of firms.
Consider a market with demand p = P (Q), and n firms with, possibly,
different cost functions Ci(qi, n); the variable n in the cost function means
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that we allow for externalities depending on the number of firms. For this
market we represent the production of each firm as qi(n), i = 1, . . . n; thus,∑n
i=1 qi(n) = Q(n).
For each set of qi(n) in the market we define the average cost function:
3
AC(n) =
1
Q(n)
n∑
i=1
Ci(qi(n), n).
In this market welfare as a function of the number of firms is:
W (n) =
∫ Q
0
P (s)ds−Q(n)AC(n).
Deriving with respect to n, we get:
W ′(n) = p
dQ
dn
− ACdQ
dn
−QdAC
dn
= (p− AC) dQ
dn
−QdAC
dn
. (12)
From equation 12 is clear that if all firms in the industry have almost
zero profits, or if new firms barely expand the market, the excess entry prob-
lem depends on the sign of dAC
dn
. Without externalities, this is the result of
Mankiw and Whinston (1986). However, there could be positive or negative
externalities among firms. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) provide an example of
negative externalities that imply excess entry. Yet, if some firms have pos-
itive profits in equilibrium and there is some market expansion with entry,
then (p − AC)dQ/dn > 0 may counterbalance the possible negative sign of
dAC
dn
. Naturally, if entrants in the market have lower costs than incumbents,
dAC
dn
could be negative, and entry would be insufficient.
Equation 12 deals with externalities and different firms. We provide now
an example, with all requirements to excess entry, surmounted by positive
externalities. Let’s consider a market where firms have costs taking the form
C(q) = F +cq, c < 1, and firms agree on a unitary price. To simplify, assume
that total output is Q = 1 and that all firms produce the same amount. It
is then obvious that each new firm steals its business from the previously
existing ones, only adding cost, and that entry is excessive. However, if there
are cost-reducing positive externalities, the cost function may take the form:
C(q, n) = F (n)+cq, with each identical firm producing q = 1/n. The average
cost in the industry will then be nF (n) + c. To judge the welfare effects of
3The numbers i and n must be integers. However, continuous functions that interpolate
among the integers may be allowed for calculations. In this case, the function Q(n) and
AC(n) are defined, and make sense, only when n is an integer, but they can be used when
n is not an integer.
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entry, we apply equation 12 to this case to get W ′(n) = −nF ′(n) − F (n).
The change in society’s welfare will then depend on the exact cost function of
firms, and we can easily find examples where entry can be insufficient even
though business stealing is still present (take, for example, F (n) = 1/nr,
with r > 1).
5. Final remarks
There is a consensus among economists on the bias toward excessive entry
in homogeneous markets with imperfect competition and business stealing
effect. This opinion is based on models with identical firms. However, when
different firms are allowed, a plethora of new possibilities is opened, and
in this paper we show with examples that insufficient entry may appear
where, with identical firms, only excess entry could happen. This is not a
positive result, but it is important to do robustness tests to the ideas that
may influence public policy.
In most real world industries, firms do not have the same market share.
Our examples show that the possibility of insufficient entry cannot be ex-
cluded only by the theory based on identical firms. With a more minute
research of each industry it is possible to arrive at the existence of excess
entry. Unfortunately, our paper shows that in most cases this investigation
is needed in order to reach this conclusion.
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